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FIERCER THAN A TIGER: WHITE-COLLAR OFFENDERS FACE 
HARSH SENTENCING IN A POST-BOOKER WORLD 
P.J. Meitl*  
 
In June 2005, prosecutors argued that Adelphia 
Communications founder John Rigas deserved 215 years in 
prison for his conviction on fraud and conspiracy charges.1 At 
the time of his conviction, Rigas was eighty years old, 
suffered from bladder cancer and was recovering from triple 
bypass surgery.2 Prosecutors justified seeking one of the 
longest white-collar sentences in United States history by 
pointing to the loss figures stemming from Rigas’ fraudulent 
actions.3 Adelphia and Rigas had already agreed in a 
settlement with the government “to forfeit assets valued at 
hundreds of millions of dollars to compensate victims of the 
fraud.”4  
 During the same month, federal prosecutors in 
Boston sought a sixteen-year prison term for Harold Stonier 
after he was convicted of hiring a hit man to kill his wife.5 
Stonier showed no remorse after his conviction, calling his 
wife “spiteful, conniving, and unrelenting.”6 Prosecutors 
stated that they believed Stonier remained a “serious threat to 
the community in general and to his wife in particular.”7  
 Although both Rigas and Stonier deserved lengthy 
sentences, it seems hardly just, appropriate, or sensical that 
federal prosecutors would seek such an extremely harsh 
sentence for John Rigas and then seek a relatively lenient one 
for a man who attempted to solicit the murder of his wife and 
was unremorseful about his actions. Unfortunately, the design 
of the current system of sentencing in the post-Booker world 
necessitates disparities of this kind, particularly in relation to 
white-collar offenses. 
 The prosecution and sentencing of white-collar 
offenders has always proved troublesome for prosecutors and 
judges. For a number of reasons, white-collar offenders are the 
most likely of all convicted defendants to receive vastly 
disparate sentences for similar crimes. Sentences are often 
based on loss amounts that prosecutors, probation officers, and 
sometimes judges attempt to calculate. Not only is this an 
inexact science, but when the crime involves a public 
company these figures tend to be astronomical and over-
representative of the true effect of the crime. Additionally, 
current Department of Justice (“DOJ”) policy requires federal 
prosecutors to seek the harshest punishment available under 
the now advisory guidelines.8 The overall effect is a system in 
which prosecutors are forced to seek overly harsh sentences 
for white-collar offenders.9  
 This article attempts to describe the lineage of this 
result. In Part I, the article defines white-collar crime, reviews 
the history of prosecutorial interest and activity in the field, 
and then explores the pattern of lenient sentences that white-
collar offenders were likely to receive prior to the imposition 
of the federal sentencing guidelines.  Part II discusses the 
guidelines themselves and the role that white-collar crimes 
played in their enactment and the growing uneasiness with the 
guidelines that resulted in a slew of infamous cases known as 
Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker. In Part III, the article 
examines the post-Booker world and the immediate effects 
that white-collar sentencing witnessed in relation to the 
changes. In particular, white-collar offenders were more likely 
to receive harsh sentences in relation to other offenders. Part 
IV discusses in detail the underlying causes of these overly 
harsh sentences, including the calculation of loss figures, 
current DOJ policy, and increased media scrutiny. Lastly, Part 
V proposes some changes that would create a more consistent 
and fair policy in regard to sentencing white-collar offenders.  
 
The Special Problem of White-Collar Crime and its 
Sentencing  
 
Defining White-Collar Crime 
 
 “White-collar” crime, is a term of criminal behavior 
used by academics and practitioners for the past sixty-five 
years. Edwin Sutherland, a noted sociologist first coined the 
term in a speech given to the American Sociological Society 
in 1939.10 Sutherland defined white-collar crime as illegal 
activities “committed by anyone of high social respectability 
in the course of his or her occupation.”11 This early definition, 
although important, was not without its critics, and debate has 
continued as a more accurate definition has been sought.  
Academics and practitioners have debated whether the 
definition should be based on the type of criminal activity, the 
social status of the criminal, or to the crimes perpetrated by 
organizations themselves.12 Today, the term has come to be 
used generically, dealing with a wide variety of work-related 
illegal acts by persons at all organizational levels.13 For this 
article’s purpose and for sake of clarity, we will adopt the 
Department of Justice standard as stated in the Attorney 
General’s report, which defined white-collar crimes as  
 
[I]llegal acts that use deceit and concealment 
– rather than the application or threat of 
physical force or violence – to obtain 
money, property, or service; to avoid the 
payment or loss of money; or to secure a 
business or personal advantage. White-collar 
criminals occupy positions of responsibility 
and trust in government, industry, the 
professions, and civic organizations.14  
 
 Such a definition implicitly alters Sutherland’s initial 
approach at defining the criminal behavior by “including the 
criminal acts of non-elite persons” and by adopting an 
“offense based rather than an offender-based definition.”15 The 
DOJ’s definition was not merely a change of words from 
Sutherland’s; it had significant ramifications for the 
investigation, prosecution, and increased public awareness of 
white-collar crime. 
 
Increased Government and Public Attention 
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 The government’s definition necessarily widens the 
class of potential criminals and prosecutable crimes, and this 
effect can be seen in the government prosecution of white-
collar crimes over the last thirty years. “Beginning in the mid-
1970s, in the aftermath of the Watergate and foreign 
government bribery scandals, the federal government began 
targeting white-collar crime as a high-priority prosecutorial 
area.”16 In the early 1980s, this “extraordinary expansion of 
the legal concept”17 of white-collar crime had a substantial 
effect on how law enforcement proceeded in approaching and 
allocating resources for investigations, prosecutions and 
sentencing of white-collar criminals. For example, the 
increasing emphasis of the DOJ on the investigation and 
prosecution of white-collar crime “caused grand jury practice 
in the federal courts to expand exponentially”18 and allowed 
prosecutors the ability to “give much greater attention to 
white-collar crime” while investigations took “place over a 
broad range of activity, from bank and securities fraud to 
public corruption to abuses of the health care system.”19 
During the 1980s, white-collar crime became one of the 
federal government's “top national priorities,”20 and Congress 
nearly quadrupled the DOJ's budget to fight it.21 This trend 
continued into the 1990s.  By 1993, the DOJ had $9.3 billion 
in its war chest22 and Attorney General Reno labeled 
prosecution of white-collar crime as one of the DOJ's top 
priorities.23 For example, in 1997, 17% of the federal criminal 
caseload consisted of fraud charges, an increase from 12% in 
1957.24 A broad look at the data reveals that “over the past 
twenty years, prosecutions of white-collar crime have 
increased exponentially in volume and visibility.”25
 
“The bottom line is 
that white collar 
criminals are just as 
much criminals as 
those who steal with a 
gun or knife.  They do 
real harm to real 
people.  They ruin 
lives. ” 
 
Pre-Guidelines Leniency 
 
 Despite the increase in resources and attention to the 
problems of white-collar crime, the sentencing of white-collar 
criminals was still one of the biggest challenges left to 
prosecutors and judges. Prior to the imposition of the 
guidelines, the prevailing theory was that white-collar 
criminals received substantially more lenient sentences than 
other criminals.26  
 Although the empirical evidence for disparities 
between sentences involving street crimes and white-collar 
crimes lacks the breadth and scope necessary to make solid 
conclusions,27 the lexicon of academic writing suggests that 
those responsible for doling out punishment were predisposed 
to sentencing white-collar defendants to lighter sentences.28 
This tendency was due to many reasons. Researchers have 
argued that juries might have been impressed or intimidated 
by high level, powerful defendants and thus reluctant to find 
guilt.29 Some have suggested that lenient or non-penal 
sentences were often imposed because of a perception that 
white-collar criminals are more sensitive or redeemable.30 
Other researchers have focused on judges and found that (pre-
Booker) “it appears that 
judges in some 
jurisdictions are overly 
willing to depart 
downward” and sentence 
white-collar “offenders 
to minimal (if any) jail 
time, home detention, or 
even probation.”31 Still 
others have concluded 
that “courts apply far 
more lenient 
standard[s]” to white-
collar employees.32
 As the belief 
that white-collar defendants were receiving significantly more 
lenient sentences became widely recognized, the call for a 
more uniform system of sentencing grew in strength. The 
justification for such a system was not hard to find, 
particularly in the arena of sentencing white-collar defendants. 
As Michael Chertoff, former criminal chief of the DOJ, noted 
in 2002: 
 
The bottom line is that white collar 
criminals are just as much criminals as those 
who steal with a gun or knife. They do real 
harm to real people. They ruin lives. Jail 
time performs two functions: it holds white 
collar criminals accountable for their past 
misdeeds, and it prevents future misbehavior 
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by those executives who might toy with the 
idea of beating the system.33
 
Sentencing Policy and White-Collar Crime’s Role 
 
Sentencing Guidelines Take Effect 
 
 Accepting the belief that white-collar defendants 
received more lenient sentences, coupled with increasing 
uneasiness about judicial disparity in sentences across the 
country as a whole, lawmakers sought to create a system of 
guidelines that would serve as a set of mandatory rules in 
sentencing for federal judges across the nation. 
 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 implemented 
“the most broad reaching reform of federal sentencing in this 
century.”34 The act made key changes in corporate sentencing 
standards for federal crimes. As Senator Kennedy has noted: 
 
One important goal of the 1984 Act was to 
eliminate the two-tier system of justice in 
which white-collar criminals received 
lenient treatments for acts of theft and fraud 
that would merit lengthy prison terms if 
committed on the street.35 
 
 Most importantly, the act sought to standardize the 
sentences given to all convicted criminals after November 1, 
1987, including white-collar criminals. The system used a 
thorough Guidelines Manual that divided offenses into 
nineteen parts. Each guideline has a base offense level that 
may be adjusted up or down given the specific characteristics 
of the crime and the criminal.36 A guideline may also have 
cross-references to other guidelines, which are equally binding 
and may dramatically increase the guideline range. 
 Supporters of the guidelines have argued that these 
guidelines have worked as intended, pointing to studies that 
support the view that inter-judge sentencing disparity has 
decreased.37 Other supporters have suggested that the 
complexity of the federal guidelines serves policies of rational 
sentencing and limiting prosecutorial discretion.38  
 There has also been significant criticism of the 
guidelines. Critics argue that the guidelines unwisely intrude 
upon and unduly restrict the sentencing court's discretion.39 
Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, courts in the 
United States enjoyed nearly unfettered discretion in 
sentencing those who had been convicted of a crime.40 Other 
critics argue that the guidelines fail to give adequate 
consideration to an offender's individual characteristics 
bearing on blameworthiness.41 Still other critics suggest that 
the guidelines result in overly harsh sentences, over-empower 
prosecutors and probation officers, and fail to achieve the goal 
of eliminating unjustified disparity in sentences.42
 Although the criticisms take varying shapes and are 
broad in scope, there is no doubt that the vast majority of 
federal judges did not favor the guidelines.  
A survey of federal judges released by the 
Federal Judicial Center in 1994, based on a 
survey conducted in October 1992, shows 
that two years ago (and two years after the 
commission’s own survey), judges remained 
overwhelmingly critical of the guidelines. It 
found that 59 percent of circuit judges and 
69 percent of district judges were “strongly” 
or “moderately” opposed to the retention of 
the “current system of mandatory 
guidelines” (with three times as many circuit 
judges and six times as many district judges 
giving the stronger of the two answers). 
Only 24 percent of circuit judges and 18 
percent of district judges “strongly” or 
“moderately” supported the guidelines 
system. A smaller but still substantial 
percentage of judges–40 percent of circuit 
judges and 49 percent of district judges–
would have eliminated the sentencing 
guidelines entirely.43  
 
The History of a Reversal 
 
 With such considerable criticism, the guidelines fell 
under increasing attack. In 2000, the U.S Supreme Court 
issued its decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, holding that 
other than a prior conviction, any fact that increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum 
must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.44 Apprendi essentially took “scores of factual 
determinations from judges and placed [them] back in the 
hands of juries.”45
 In 2004, the Supreme Court evaluated the state of 
Washington’s sentencing guidelines in the landmark case, 
Blakely v. Washington. Building on its decision in Apprendi, 
the Court found that the Washington statute, which allowed 
judges to impose sentences beyond the guidelines, was invalid 
because it violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.46 
Almost immediately, the federal courts found themselves in 
turmoil as they wrestled with Blakely’s impact on the 
continuing validity of the federal guidelines.47 They would not 
have to wait long, as the court moved to hear two cases at the 
beginning of its October 2004 term.48
 In January 2005, the Supreme Court released it 
opinions regarding dual cases, U.S. v. Booker and U.S. v. 
Fanfan. In a split 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that its decision 
in Blakely applied to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which 
they had found to be mandatory and therefore 
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unconstitutional.49 The Court’s remedy was to make the 
guidelines an advisory system, effectively giving judges 
greater discretion and freedom to sentence outside the bounds 
of the guidelines.50 As one district court judge put it shortly 
after the Booker decision: 
 
Sentencing will be harder now than it was a 
few months ago. District courts cannot just 
add up figures and pick a number within a 
narrow range. Rather, they must consider all 
of the applicable factors, listen carefully to 
defense and government counsel, and 
sentence the person before them as an 
individual. Booker is not an invitation to do 
business as usual.51  
 
Post-Booker Developments and Policy 
 
 Following U.S. v. Booker, judges, prosecutors, and 
defense attorneys were uncertain how to use the guidelines. 
Should the guidelines truly only be advisory and used as one 
factor out of many, which would lead to a higher number of 
departures from the guideline ranges, or should judges adhere 
to the guidelines in all but the most extreme cases?  
 The considerable confusion led many judges and 
prosecutors to maintain the status quo. Several of the early 
decisions post-Booker exemplified the belief by many judges 
as to the necessity of using guidelines.52 Some went as far as 
to say that the guidelines should be viewed as essentially 
mandatory rules. For example, Judge Paul Cassell, a federal 
district court judge from Utah stated that in the post-Booker 
world, “only close adherence to the Guidelines offers any 
prospect of treating similarly-situated offenders equally.”53 
Judge Cassell, who had the honor of being the first judge to 
issue a post-Booker  sentencing decision, also stated “the 
Guidelines are the only way to create consistent sentencing as 
they are the only uniform standard available to guide the 
hundreds of district judges around the country.”54 Judge 
Cassell concluded that the “court will only depart from those 
Guidelines in unusual cases for clearly identified and 
persuasive reasons.”55 Judge Cassell’s initial approach was 
followed by a number of federal courts around the country in 
some manner. For example, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held that judges do 
not have “unfettered discretion” after Booker and that the 
congressionally-mandated factors set forth in the Sentencing 
Reform Act, prominently including the Guidelines, still 
constrain the imposition of criminal sentences.56
 Judges were not alone in treating the Guidelines with 
far greater deference than the term “advisory” implies. Shortly 
after Booker, the DOJ issued a policy statement saying that its 
prosecutors will urge that sentences should coincide with the 
calculated Guidelines range in all but extraordinary cases.57 As 
one court has stated “in essence, the Department of Justice 
continues to treat the guidelines as mandatory, by asserting 
that the Court has no discretion to deviate therefrom.”58
 In particular, experts were uncertain about the effect 
that the Booker decision would have on white-collar 
sentences. Given that one of the justifications for imposing the 
guidelines in 1987 was that white-collar criminals received 
substantially more lenient sentences, many predicted that 
judges and juries would revert to pre-guidelines form and 
sentence those convicted of white-collar crimes to 
substantially lower sentences.59 On the other hand, given the 
wave of corporate wrongdoing in the early part of the 
decade,60 the increased media scrutiny of financial crimes,61 
and notable white-collar defendants in the headlines,62 some 
wondered if white-collar defendants would receive harsher 
sentences, a reversal of the pre-1987 typology of lenient 
sentencing.  
 The latter concern, that white-collar offenders would 
be more likely to receive excessively harsh sentences, seemed 
to manifest itself in a number of cases in 2005. Prosecutors, 
particularly in high profile cases, sought sentences that, 
although technically still within the guideline ranges, seemed 
disproportionately harsh. Some examples include:   
 
• Federal prosecutors asked a judge to impose what 
amounted to a life sentence for former WorldCom 
CEO Bernard Ebbers, convicted in the company's 
$11 billion accounting fraud.63 “In the Ebbers case, 
the sentencing request was largely the result of the 
size of the decline in WorldCom's market value as a 
result of the fraud.”64 Ebbers attorneys “maintained 
that the dollar amount of the loss caused by the fraud 
overstated the seriousness of the crime. They also 
argued that the fraud ultimately yielded ‘little or no 
gain’ to Mr. Ebbers because of the steep decline in 
WorldCom's stock price. Defense Counsel cited his 
community service, his charity work and his health” 
as justifications for a less harsh sentence.65 Ebbers 
was eventually sentenced to 25 years.66 
• Prosecutors sought a fourteen year and a thirty-three 
year sentence in the case of two former Merrill Lynch 
executives for their role in the Enron Nigerian barge 
fiasco.67 The bankers had been primary actors in a 
scheme where Enron sold electricity-producing 
barges in Nigeria to Merrill Lynch but later bought 
them back at a predetermined price.68 Prosecutors 
based the requested sentences on the calculations of 
loss to Enron shareholders, which they estimated to 
be $43.8 million.69  The sentencing judge disputed 
this figure and found that he couldn't accurately 
determine the loss. Instead he used an alternative 
figure of $1.4 million, an amount that represented the 
gains from the fraudulent conduct.70 
 
The Underlying Causes of Harsh White-Collar Sentencing 
 
 Prosecutors will likely continue to seek sentences 
similar to these two examples for a number of reasons. 
Particularly in financial crimes involving public companies, 
government attorneys are at the same time constrained by DOJ 
rules and set free by the interpretation of those rules. The 
calculation of loss coupled with DOJ policy regarding 
flexibility in seeking sentences creates a perfect storm for 
harsh sentencing. Add the additional pressures that 
prosecutors face, such as intense media scrutiny and the 
increased public attention, to the mix, and the system is 
designed to ensure sentences that are disproportionately harsh 
on white-collar offenders. A more detailed analysis of the 
underlying reasons is considered below. 
 
Calculation of Loss Amounts 
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The new policy also states that 
prosecutors must seek the most 
severe sentence allowed by the 
law unless there are overriding 
considerations. 
 White-collar cases are unique in that the sentence 
sought is often heavily dependent upon a loss figure that the 
prosecutor in conjunction with the probation officer finds prior 
to sentencing.71 A calculation of loss by the prosecutor is 
required in all cases involving fraud, larceny, and 
embezzlement cases (known as economic crimes).72 Economic 
crimes make up a substantial portion of 
the crimes prosecuted in federal courts. 
For example, in 1999, sixteen to 
twenty percent, of the 54,903 federal 
cases sentenced required a 
determination of “loss.”73  
 Under the Guidelines, 'loss' is 
“the value of the money, property or 
services unlawfully taken.”74 The 
greater of the actual or intended loss 
controls. The loss calculation includes not only the count or 
counts of conviction, but all relevant conduct.75 The 
government has the burden of proving loss by a preponderance 
of the evidence. Although “the loss need not be determined 
with precision” and a “reasonable estimate” is enough, 
speculation will not suffice.76  
 But the loss figure can be inflated in a number of 
ways. For example, the defendant's conduct must only be one 
cause of the loss. A common case in which this principle 
produces high loss numbers occurs when a defendant defrauds 
a public corporation and the stock price drops over the same 
period of time. Other factors, such as the overall market, 
competitors, etc. do not necessarily have to be taken into 
account. Although there is no Supreme Court opinion on the 
subject, most circuits have found that the loss found is usually 
the entire loss that the victim suffered and not just the 
percentage of the loss equal to the percentage of causation 
attributable to the defendant,77 necessarily inflating the loss 
number and giving the prosecutor and the judge the ability to 
over-inflate the sentence. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit 
has held that the defendant cannot be held responsible for 
losses “caused by the intervening, independent, and 
unforeseeable criminal misconduct of a third party.”78  
 Judges are free to find their own figure, but in reality, 
the prosecutor’s figure is usually used because of the 
complexity and time-intensive nature of the calculation.  
Given the malleability of the number, prosecutors are often 
able to manipulate the process. It is possible that prosecutors 
as a whole are a conscientious and moral group that seeks to 
find the accurate loss number. Pressure for a lengthier 
sentence, however, can be a powerful influence in a number of 
cases such as in a high-profile trial, in a case where the 
defendant or the defendant’s attorney has been particularly 
antagonistic, or when the prosecution has expended 
considerably more time and resources than usual. 
 For example, in a pre-Booker case, a Houston jury 
found Jamie Olis, a former executive at Dynergy, a Houston-
based pipeline company, guilty of a battery of charges — 
conspiracy, securities fraud, mail fraud and wire fraud — 
related to an accounting scheme called Project Alpha, which 
attempted to mask $300 million of debt as revenue.79 The case 
received notable attention, because of Dynergy’s ties to Enron. 
Olis was sentenced to 24 years in 
prison, largely because of the judge’s 
loss finding.80 U.S. District Judge Sim 
Lake put the loss at a minimum of 
$105 million.81 He based that finding 
on his view of losses suffered by the 
University of California, a major 
Dynergy shareholder and lead plaintiff 
in a class-action lawsuit against the 
company.82 This figure, which many 
experts deemed excessively high and out of touch with the 
reality of the harm actually incurred, was a drop in the bucket 
compared to what prosecutors sought. The government urged 
Lake to figure investors' losses at more than $500 million — 
and perhaps twice that amount — based on the hit taken by all 
shareholders, not just the university.83 Olis’s sentence of 24 
years is even more remarkable because it was his first offense, 
he is not eligible for parole at any point during the sentence, 
and because the judge appeared reluctant to sentence Olis so 
harshly.84 “I take no pleasure in sentencing you to 292 
months,” Lake stated, “[s]ometimes good people commit bad 
acts, and that's what happened in this case.”85
 The calculation of loss amounts can, at times, greatly 
overstate the true effect of the criminal behavior. This is 
particularly true in public corporation settings, where millions 
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and perhaps billions of dollars are lost after a revelation that 
criminal acts have occurred inside a company. Although there 
is a consensus that greater sentencing should occur when there 
are greater losses, today’s system is destined to produce overly 
harsh sentences for white-collar offenders.  
 
DOJ Policy Requiring Most Severe Sentencing 
 
 In addition to loss calculations, the DOJ’s policy 
regarding prosecutorial discretion in seeking sentences is 
another roadblock to achieving just and more consistent 
sentencing for white-collar offenders. In September 2003, 
Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a policy directive to all 
DOJ attorneys that required the seeking of the most serious 
charges possible in almost all cases.86 Except in limited, 
narrow circumstances, federal prosecutors must seek to bring 
charges for “the most serious, readily provable offense that 
can be supported by the facts of the case.”87 The new policy 
also states that prosecutors must seek the most severe sentence 
allowed by the law unless there are overriding 
considerations.88
 The move was only one in a series of steps taken by 
the Justice Department to concentrate power in the Attorney 
General’s office and to crack down on perceived “lenient 
practices by some prosecutors and judges.”89 Ashcroft stated, 
“[t]he direction I am giving our U.S. Attorneys today is direct 
and emphatic.”90 Ashcroft’s move effectively reversed 
Attorney General Janet Reno’s policy, which was issued in the 
mid-1990s and gave prosecutors more discretion over how 
their cases should be handled by allowing for an 
“individualized assessment” of the facts and circumstances of 
the case.91  
 Given the fact that Justice Department attorneys are 
acting as if the guidelines are still mandatory,92 prosecuting 
attorneys have little choice but to seek the highest sentence 
possible for a white-collar offender. Coupled with the loss 
amount, the prosecutor is often left with little choice but to 
seek a sentence that they know is overly harsh and 
inappropriate. 
 
Pressures on Prosecutors 
 
 Prosecutors, although generally “in it” for the right 
reasons, are still not immune from a number of unique 
pressures that can add to the likelihood that prosecutors will 
seek a harsh sentence. Given the prosecutor’s unique role in 
the system of criminal justice and sentencing, these pressures, 
if manifested in an abuse of power or poor decision-making, 
are factors that will increase the probability of harsh 
sentencing.  
 As Joy Anne Boyd describes, U.S. Attorneys play a 
crucial role in the system and their discretion is a hallmark of 
their responsibilities:  
 
[F]ederal prosecutors have broad 
discretionary powers in charging a 
defendant and recommending a sentence if 
the defendant is convicted. Not only may a 
prosecutor choose whether to pursue any 
given case, but she also decides which 
charges to file. Given that most judges still 
give the guidelines either substantial weight 
in their sentencing decisions or use them as 
one of a limited number of factors, this 
power is critical. Because many criminal 
acts potentially involve a number of offenses 
- the sentences for which vary (sometimes 
greatly) - the prosecutor's decision as to 
which “base offense” to charge could have 
an enormous impact on the length of the 
sentence imposed. . . The federal prosecutor 
also has the power to decide which, if any, 
aggravating factors will be presented to the 
court. The totality of the prosecutor's 
decisions as to which offenses will be 
charged and which aggravating factors to 
present in the end points to one sentencing 
range. 93
 
 In the case of white-collar offenders, these factors often lead 
to harsh and overstated sentences. 
 With great power comes great pressure. The political 
and media pressure to be “tough on crime” and therefore seek 
harsh sentences is extremely intense.94 “When the media 
jumps on a case, splashing it across the front pages of 
newspapers or making it the lead story on the local news, the 
attention often moves public opinion, subjecting prosecutors, 
whose boss is elected by voters, to public opinion and political 
pressure.”95 Prosecutors themselves recognize this pressure. 
Manuals on prosecuting in the limelight have stated that when 
a “well-known person is suspected; the added media attention 
can visit incredible pressure upon the prosecutor. At the 
outset, the prosecutor should be tough in making the charging 
decision - certainly a safe and generally popular move.”96
 Prosecutors might place pressure on themselves as 
well. As one former prosecutor has noted, “the pressure to 
seek and obtain [a certain sentence] depends not only on the 
‘media's portrayal of the case’ at hand but on circumstances 
external to it: For example, there might be a significant case 
recently lost which compels the prosecutor to seek to regain 
public confidence.”97
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 Pressure on a prosecutor is unlikely to go away or 
recede from the prosecutorial landscape; however, when 
added to a mix that includes top-heavy loss calculations and 
inflexible Justice Department standards, these pressures have 
added importance. One of the last bastions of prosecutorial 
discretion lies in prosecutors’ ability to choose who to file 
against and what to file. If a prosecutor is pressured by the 
media, politics, or by their own subjective feelings, harsher 
sentences are even more likely than before.  
 
Proposed Changes  
 
 Although we are only eleven months post-Booker, 
the system seems to be aligned in a way that forces and 
encourages prosecutors to seek overly harsh sentences for 
white-collar offenders. A solution to this dilemma is both 
complex and contentious but we can begin by offering broad-
policy based solutions. The following modest bare-bones 
proposals are meant only to be starting-off points for further 
discussion and analysis.   
 First, the DOJ should issue new guidelines that alter 
the calculation of loss. The current system, which bases 
calculations on the directives and edicts proscribed by the 
federal sentencing guidelines, fail to take into account the 
overstatement that occurs when the crime involves a public 
corporation. By requiring the prosecutor to attribute the 
percentage of the loss equal to the percentage of causation by 
the defendant, we would go a long way towards alleviating the 
overstatement of loss that is currently endemic in white-collar 
sentencing. Detailed guidelines could be included in this 
policy, which could be created in conjunction with market 
analysts, economists, and forensic accountants. The policy 
would of course be left open to interpretation to some degree 
but by clearly laying out the objectives of the policy, 
prosecutors would be more likely to arrive at fairer numbers 
that more accurately reflected the loss caused by the offender.  
 Second, the DOJ should reverse its own policy in 
regard to seeking the highest sentences possible for white-
collar crimes. While this article does not explore the effects 
that Ashcroft’s policy has had on other crimes and 
sentencings, it seems clear that prosecutors should be given 
greater discretion when choosing what sentences to seek in 
white-collar offenses. The reasoning behind this argument lies 
mainly in the calculation of loss, which, if the prosecutor feels 
is overstated, can be adjusted for by the discretion of the 
prosecuting attorney. It is unlikely, given the increased 
awareness and pressures previously mentioned that a slew of 
lenient sentences would be doled out upon the reversal of this 
policy. The likely result would simply be a departure 
downwards in sought sentences in cases where justice required 
such an adjustment.  
 Congressional action, in the form of a response to 
U.S. v. Booker, would likely concentrate on the creation of 
mandatory minimums and some form of a re-establishment of 
the Guidelines. The effect of such a move, which seems 
increasingly unlikely,98 is uncertain. On the one hand, if the 
Congressional action focused on enacting sentence minimums, 
it would have little effect on the current harshness of the 
system. On the other hand, such a move might alleviate some 
of the pressure from Main Justice to force sentences and 
charges on its prosecutors, effectively freeing up discretion 
and allowing individual prosecutors to seek just sentencing.  
 The prosecutors seeking a sentence of 215 years for 
John Rigas, an 80 year old man suffering from bladder cancer, 
have in a way been victims of the three pressures previously 
discussed: overstated loss calculations, inflexible DOJ 
mandates, and media/political pressure. These pressures have 
grown over time and have now created a perfect storm for 
overly harsh sentencing of white-collar offenders. Although 
prosecutors were hoping to send a message with their 
conviction and sentence, did they send the message they had 
hoped for?  
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SUPREME COURT WATCH: 
UPCOMING CRIMINAL CASES ON 
THE 2005-2006 DOCKET 
CLB Staff* 
 
Given the constantly evolving nature of the criminal 
justice system, it is important to stay on top of developments 
in the law, especially the most recent Supreme Court 
decisions.  This section provides an overview of criminal 
cases that the Supreme Court has agreed to hear as part of the 
2005-06 docket.   
 
Patrick Day v. James Crosby (Fl. Department of Corrections)  
 
Docket Number:  04-1324 
? Eleventh Circuit 
? Questions Presented: 
1.  When the state fails to plead or otherwise raise a statute of 
limitations defense and expressly concedes that the petition 
was timely, does it waive that defense to a habeas corpus 
petition? 
2.  Can a district court rely on habeas rule 4 in order to dismiss 
a habeas petition on its own motion after the state has filed an 
answer that is based on a ground not raised in that answer? 
? Facts:   
After his conviction for second degree murder, Day filed 
a petition for writ of habeas corpus; however, the statute of 
limitations for filing the petition had expired. A federal 
magistrate ordered the state to submit an answer addressing all 
its affirmative defenses to the petition.  The state's answer, 
however, erroneously agreed that Day had submitted his 
petition in compliance with the statute of limitations and 
therefore did not raise a limitations defense. The district court 
then issued an order, sua sponte, dismissing Day’s petition as 
untimely, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
the dismissal. Since habeas cases are not governed by the 
general rule that when a defendant fails to plead the statute of 
limitations as an affirmative defense, it waives that defense, a 
court may review the scenario sua sponte. 
 
Bobby Holmes v. South Carolina 
 
Docket Number:  04-1327 
? South Carolina Supreme Court 
? Question Presented: 
Does a state's rule governing admissibility of third-party guilt 
evidence violate a criminal defendant's constitutional right to 
present a complete defense? 
? Facts: 
Holmes was convicted of multiple crimes, including first 
degree murder, and sentenced to death. At his trial, the court 
did not allow Holmes to present evidence that a third party had 
committed the crimes with which he had been charged. On 
appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, applying  
